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ARTICLES
THE 1994 I.L.C. DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A PRINCIPLED APPRAISAL OF
JURISDICTIONAL STRUCTURE
Bradley E. Berg*
INTRODUCTION
FOR AT LEAST ONE HUNDRED YEARS, the international legal commu-
nity has been contemplating the establishment of a permanent interna-
tional criminal court. While ad hoc international criminal tribunals have
been created on several occasions, including four times this century -
Nuremberg, Tokyo, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda - the world has
not yet seen a permanent international criminal court.' This may soon
change. The most recent model put forth by the International Law
Commission (I.L.C.) has attracted the greatest international support of any
permanent court proposal made to date, and an assessment of the
strengths and weaknesses of this model is critical if we are to ensure that
the debate over the proposal is well-informed and proceeds on a princi-
pled basis.2
After providing a brief overview of the evolution and jurisdictional
structure of the 1994 LL.C. Draft Statute, this Article will propose that
" B.Comm., LL.B. (Sask.), LL.M. (Toronto), Member of the Bar of Saskatchewan
and the law firm of Blake, Cassels and Graydon, Toronto. The author would like to
thank Professors Martin Friedland, Craig Scott, Rob Howse, and Karen Knop, as well
as David Wiseman and, always, Brian Rolfes.
Perhaps the most famous ad hoc tribunal was the 1810 Congress of Aix-la-
Chapelle which tried and convicted Napoleon Bonaparte for waging unjust wars, sen-
tencing him to exile on Elba. In 1895, in a proposal rejected by the Institute of
International Law, the International Red Cross recommended the creation of a perma-
nent international criminal court to deter continued violations of war. 1 BENJAMiN B.
FRENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRPu1 AL CoumR. A STEP TowARD WoRLD PEACE 6
(1980). See also Michael D. Greenberg, Creating an International Criminal Court, 10
B.U. INT'L LJ. 119, 122-25 (1992).
2 This recent proposal is the Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court,
Int'l L. Comm'n, 46th Sess., U.N. Doe. AICN.4/L.491/Rev.2 (1994) [hereinafter
Working Group Report]. This Article will hereinafter refer to this proposal as "the
I.L.C. Court."
CASE W. RES. J. INTL L.
this draft statute and other models be evaluated according to four princi-
ples and two objectives which underlie international criminal law. These
principles are individual criminal responsibility, non-retroactivity, judicial
independence, and the guarantee against double jeopardy; the objectives
are deterrence and legitimacy. At various points, the 1994 I.L.C. Draft
Statute will be contrasted to six previous proposals for the establishment
of a permanent international criminal court: the Sottile Proposal (1951), 3
the United Nations Draft Statute (1953), 4 the International Law Associa-
tion (I.L.A.) Proposal (1982), s the Bassi6uni Proposal (1987),6 the
Siracusa Proposal (1990),' and the American Bar Association (A.B.A.)
Proposal (1991).8 Similarly, on certain questions, the 1994 I.L.C. Draft
Statute will be compared with the jurisdictional structures of the four ad
hoc tribunals convened in this century: the International Military Tribunal
at Nuremberg,9 the International Military Tribunal for the Far East," the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia," and the
3 See generally ANTOINE SoTrLE, LE PROBLEME DE LA CREATION D'UNE COUR
PENALE INTERNATIONALE PERMANENTE (1951) [THE PROBLEM OF THE CREATION OF A
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT] (Kraus Reprint Ltd. trans., 1966).
4 Report of the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N.
GAOR, 9th Sess., Annex, Supp. No. 12, at 23, U.N. Doc. A/2645 (1954).
' See generally Int'l Crim. L. Comm., Int'l L. Ass'n, Sixth Interim Report, in
REPORT OF THE 61ST CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION 252
(1985).
6 See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOuNI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE
AND DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRMnINAL TRIBUNAL 1987 [hereinafter
BASSIbuNi, DRAFT CODE AND STATUTE].
' This proposal was developed by a group of experts under the auspices of the
Intituto Superiore Internzionale di Scienze Criminale, and was based largely on an
earlier draft statute for a criminal court to implement the Apartheid Convention. Draft
Statute for the Creation of an International Criminal Jurisdiction to Implement the
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1426 (1981). See Jose A. Baez, An International Crimes Court: Fur-
ther Tales of the King of Corinth, 23 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 289, 300 (1993).
' The American Bar Association Task Force on an International Criminal Court-
Preliminary Report to the House of Delegates (Jan. 1992). See also Baez, supra note
7, at 307-09.
9 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59
Stat. 1544, 1555, 82 U.N.T.S. 251, 279 [hereinafter I.M.T. Charter].
" International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. 1589, 4
Bevans 20.
" Secretary General's Report on Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunal
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR,
[Vol. 28:221
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International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. 2 The analysis that follows
will reveal that, while generally sound and a marked improvement over
previous models, the 1994 I.L.C. Draft Statute is deficient in four impor-
tant respects, all of which can be cured by amendments to the statute.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE 1994 I.L.C. STATUTE
From the day of its inception in 1946, the I.L.C. has been the
principal player on the project of creating a permanent international
criminal court. While the I.L.C.'s original mandate was to facilitate the
development of international law through codification, 3 its first specific
task was a request by the General Assembly in 1948 to study the possi-
bility of establishing an organ of international criminal jurisdiction. 14
Ever since, except for a substantial hiatus from the mid-1950s to the early
1980s, the work of the LL.C. in international criminal law has been split
between the twin projects of developing an international criminal code
and establishing an international criminal court.
For most of its life, the Commission's primary concern has been the
development of the Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Securi-
ty of Mankind. A version of the Draft Code was presented to the General
Assembly in 1954,'" but was held in abeyance without endorsement
48th Sess., at 36, U.N. Doe. S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993)
[hereinafter Yugoslav Statute].
2 Security Council Resolution 955 (1994) Establishing the International Tribunal for
Rwanda, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg. at 3, U.N. Doe. S/RES/955 (1994),
reprinted in 33 LL.M. 1598 (1994) [hereinafter Rwandan Statute].
," Establishment of an International Law Commission, G.A. Res. 174(1), U.N.
GAOR, 2nd Sess., 123rd mtg. at 1272-79, U.N. Doe. No. A/504 (1947). Resolution
174(1) expressly placed codification among the tasks of the new Commission. Id. When
the I.L.C. was directed to consolidate the Judgment of the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg, it was also charged with drafting a code of international
crimes. Id. at 1280-82.
,4 Upon the conclusion of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948, S. REP. No. 2, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985);
78 U.N.T.S. 1021 [hereinafter Genocide Convention], which contemplates the possibility
of an international criminal court in Article VI, the General Assembly directed the
I.L.C. to investigate the issue of establishing a criminal tribunal. Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Study by the I.L.C. of the Question of an Inter-
national Criminal Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 260B(Ml), U.N. GAOR, 179th mtg. (1948),
reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE QUESTION OF INTERNATION-
AL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION at 5-6, U.N. Doe. No. A/CN.4I7/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No.
1949.V.8 (1949).
,S Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. GAOR,
9th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 9, U.N. Do. AJ2693 (1954). A definition of aggression for
1996]
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pending work that was proceeding simultaneously on the definition of
aggression. It was not until 1981 that the General Assembly invited the
I.L.C. to resume its work on the Draft Code, and in 1989 the I.L.C. was
requested to consider the establishment of a court of general international
criminal jurisdiction to facilitate the work proceeding on the Draft Code.
By 1992, the court project had superseded the long-delayed Draft Code
in terms of interest and priority within the I.L.C., and a special working
group was convened to produce a Draft Statute for an international
criminal court. 6 The two projects have proceeded more or less indepen-
dently since 1992 following a shift in the philosophy of the I.L.C. away
from a code-centric international criminal court. In 1993, the special
working group opened a Draft Statute for international consideration and
comment.' One year later, the working group produced the 1994 Draft
Statute for an International Criminal Court, which was adopted by the
I.L.C. in Geneva at its forty-sixth session. 9 The draft is presently before
the Sixth Committee and is expected to be considered by the General As-
sembly in the near future.'
the purposes of state acts was adopted by the General Assembly in 1974. However, the
definition of aggression for the purposes of individual criminal offenses continues to be
one of the many barriers to progress on the Code. Michael P. Scharf, The Jury is Still
Out on the Need for an International Criminal Court, 1 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
135, 157-58 (1991).
36 See Report of the International Law Commission on its Forty-Fifth Session, U.N.
GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No.10, at 21-25, U.N. Doc. A/48/10 (1993). See also James
Crawford, The IL.C.'s Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal, 88 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 140 (1994) (discussing the 1993 draft) [hereinafter Crawford, Draft Statute].
For a discussion of the 1994 draft, see James Crawford, The I.L.C. Adopts a Statute
for an International Criminal Court, 89 AM. J. INT'L. L. 404 (1995) [hereinafter
Crawford, IL.C. Statute].
," Work on the Draft Code of Crimes continues. In 1991, a version of the Draft
Code was provisionally adopted by the I.L.C., the text of which is attached to the
I.L.C. report of that year. See Report of the International Law Commission on the
Work of its Forty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 238, U.N.
Doe. A/46/10 (1991).
" See Report of the Working Group and the Draft Statute of the International
Criminal Court, 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 100, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1993/Add.1
(Part 2), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 253 (1994).
"9 International Law Commission Concludes Forty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doe. 194/4
(1994). See generally Working Group Report, supra note 2.
o On November 23, 1994, the Sixth Committee considered the 1994 I.L.C. Draft
Statute and passed a resolution to the following effect: an ad hoc committee was struck
to review the statute and submit a report to the next General Assembly; additional
comments from member states and organs of the U.N. were invited; the Secretary-
General was asked to prepare financial estimates for the proposed court's establishment
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II. THE JURISDICTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE 1994 I.L.C. DRAFr
STATUTE
The 1994 I.L.C. Draft Statute proposes the creation of an internation-
al criminal court by multilateral treaty, thereby establishing state consent
as a central theme of the Statute' The I.L.C. Court would not be de-
pendent on the Security Council for its existence, although unspecified
future arrangements are intended to foster a close relationship to the
United Nations. While the Court would be permanent, it would be not
be a standing or full-time institution.' This reflects a compromise be-
tween the virtues of permanency and the practical expectation that, at
least initially, the Court would not be sufficiently busy to necessitate a
full-time structure. If the Presidency of the Court desires a conversion to
full-time status due to increases in workload, it could request the States
that are party to the Statute to pass a resolution implementing such a
change. 24
Part 3 of the Statute contains the principal jurisdictional framework
of the I.L.C. Court.' For the most part, like the International Court of
Justice (I.C.J.), the I.L.C. Court would operate on the basis of "ceded
and operation; and the Sixth Committee resolved to consider the ad hoc committee's
report during the next General Assembly. Report of the International Law Commission
on the Work of Its Forty-Sixth Session, U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 49th Sess., at 17-18.
U.N. Doc. A/49/738 (1994). The General Assembly subsequently adopted the resolution
of the Sixth Committee without a vote. Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, G.A. Res. 49/53, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., 84th mtg., Supp. No. 49, at 293,
U.N. Doc. A149/49 (1994).
2" Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent references to articles refer to those of
the 1994 Draft Statute.
' Working Group Report, supra note 2, 1994 Draft Statute, at art. 4. Depending on
the Court's precise form, an amendment to the U.N. Charter may be necessary, id.,
although this is unlikely.
2 Working Group Report, supra note 3, 1994 Draft Statue, at art. 4.
24 Such a resolution would require a two-thirds majority to be successful. Id. at art.
10, 14. This article also prohibits certain personal activities that may compromise the
independence of a judge. Article 17 ensures secure remuneration for the judiciary. The
provisions pertaining to the composition and administration of the Court, including the
election of judges, are found at Articles 5-19. See also Crawford, Draft Statute, supra
note 16, at 144.
' Article 20 lists the crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the Court; Article
21 states the preconditions to jurisdiction; Article 22 provides for state acceptance of
the Court's jurisdiction in a given case; and Article 23 pertains to the Court's jurisdic-
tion in the face of Security Council action. Under Article 24, the Court has in each
case a general duty to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction before proceeding.
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jurisdiction" - that is, it would acquire jurisdiction in a given case only
through state consent.' Also like the I.C.J., the I.L.C. Court structure
distinguishes between a state's general support for the Court and that
state's acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction in a given caseY The
former would occur through state accession to the treaty and Statute,
while the latter would occur through a declaration lodged with the Court
by the state. This declaration could be of general application or could be
limited to type of conduct or conduct committed during a specified period
of timeY
The jurisdiction of a court can be conceptualized as having three
components: personal jurisdiction (ratione personae), subject matter
jurisdiction (ratione materiae), and the "form" or "nature" of the jurisdic-
tion itself.29 Under the I.L.C. Court, the component of personal jurisdic-
tion is uncomplicated: only natural persons would be subject to the new
tribunal." The second component, subject matter jurisdiction, is the body
of law over which the I.L.C. Court would have jurisdiction. It is
exhaustively stated in five heads under Article 20: genocide, aggression,
serious violations of the laws and customs of armed conflict, crimes
against humanity, and exceptionally serious instances of crimes established
under treaties listed in the Annex to the Statute. The first four heads are
collectively referred to as "crimes under general international law"; the
final head is referred to as "treaty crimes." These five offense groupings
are greatly clarified below.
The final component, the form or nature of jurisdiction, is a direct
product of the voluntariness of the I.L.C.'s approach: the Court would
The two sole exceptions are cases of genocide.
Working Group Report, supra note 2, 1994 Draft Statute, at art. 22. A dec-
laration of general jurisdictional acceptance would be analogous to the so-called
"optional clause" in Article 36, R2, of the I.CJ. Statute. U.N. CHARTER, I.CJ. STAT-
Ur, art. 36, 12. "General support" is shown by becoming party to the court's
constitutive statute. In the case of the I.CJ., membership in the U.N. automatically
makes a state party to the Statute of the I.CJ. Id. at art. 93. The J.CJ. requires
additional action, principally consensual submission, in order to acquire jurisdiction in
a given case. Id. at art. 36.
' Working Group Report, supra note 2, 1994 Draft Statute, at art. 22.
29 See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Second
Session, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. 10, at 46-48, U.N. Doc. A/45/10 (1990)
(discussing the jurisdictional framework of an international criminal court); see also
Baez, supra note 7, at 302-03.
' Previous proposals have suggested prosecuting corporations, other organizations or
sovereign states. Restricting personal jurisdiction to natural persons is an assumption
that runs throughout the Draft Statute and is confirmed by the commentary. Curiously,
however, the Draft Statute does not expressly state this restriction.
226 [Vol. 28:221
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have concurrent original jurisdiction. Barring Security Council action
under Chapter VII, an alternative that already exists today, the Statute
does not reserve a single instance of international crime for the exclusive
domain of this new court. Domestic courts would continue to have
judicial jurisdiction over every international crime, although cases falling
under the Statute would now also be subject to the judicial jurisdiction of
the I.L.C. Court. As we will see, Part 3 of the Statute contains a number
of stringent requirements in order that a case become subject to the
international court's jurisdiction. In comparison to both earlier court pro-
posals and the range of cases that potentially could have been covered,
the jurisdictional basket of the I.L.C. Court is relatively small.
The practical operation of the whole of Part 3 of the Statute is
considerably more complicated than the three preceding components may
suggest. It can be summarized in the following manner.
(I) FOR THE TWO HEADS OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS AND
CUSTOMS OF ARMED CONFLICT AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, the
procedure is the most straightforward." The Court would acquire juris-
diction in a case involving these offenses if suitable declarations have
been or are then lodged pursuant to Article 22 by each of the following
states: the state in custody of the accused; the state in whose territory the
alleged offense was committed; and, if applicable, the state or states that
have lawfully requested extradition of the accused for this offense, the
request(s) not having been rejected by the custodial state.3"
(II) FOR THE HEAD OF AGGRESSION, the procedure mirrors (I), but
with one exception. No person could be charged with aggression under
the Statute unless the Security Council had first determined that a State
had committed the act of aggression which is the subject of the charge 3
"' The general provision for subject matter jurisdiction over armed conflict offenses
and crimes against humanity is Article 20(c) and (d). Note that "serious violations of
the laws and customs applicable in armed conflict" refers to serious offenses committed
during wartime, but avoids the requirement of "war" due to the fact that modem armed
conflicts generally occur in the absence of a formal declaration of war. This subject
matter head is probably intended to encompass certain offenses under the war crimes
provisions of the Hague Convention of 1907 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
On Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 227, 1 Bevans 631. See also Working Group Report,
supra note 2, Commentary, Addendum 1, at 23-25.
2 Working Group Report, supra note 2, 1994 Draft Statute, at art. 21. The
incorporation of the existing extradition system is a necessary corollary to the concur-
rent jurisdiction approach. The I.L.C. Court is intended to complement the existing in-
ternational criminal justice system, including extradition procedures. See id. at pt. 7
(arts. 51-57, which are provisions for international cooperation and judicial assistance).
" Id. at art. 23, 2. The general provision for subject matter jurisdiction over
2271996]
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This provision reflects a compromise between the desirability of individu-
al criminal responsibility for aggression and the practical fact that aggres-
sion (or "crime against peace") is bound to state action?4
(I) UNDER THE HEAD OF GENOCIDE, the Statute combines with the
Genocide Convention35 to produce the I.L.C. Court's only opportunity
for inherent jurisdiction. If the Court received a complaint of genocide
from a state that is party to both this Statute and the Genocide Conven-
tion, the Court would automatically acquire jurisdiction over that case re-
gardless of the location of the alleged offense, the consent of the states
involved, or any other factor. 6 The granting of inherent jurisdiction
under this head is a reflection of the universal acknowledgement of
genocide as a part of jus cogens, the widely ratified status of the Geno-
cide Convention, and particularly, the Convention's express contemplation
of an international criminal court for this offense.37
(IV) THE HEAD OF TREATY CRMES is exhaustively defined in scope
by the list of thirteen treaties in the Annex to the Statute.38 In contrast
to the offenses discussed above, these crimes are not part of general
international law, but are applicable through accession to their respective
conventions. 9 The treaty list includes, among others, the Apartheid
aggression is Article 20(b).
See Working Group Report, supra note 2, Commentary, Addendum 1, at 22.
3 Genocide Convention, supra note 14.
This is the combined effect of Articles 21, 9l(a) and 25, 1, Working Group
Report, supra note 2, 1994 Draft Statute. The general provision for subject-matter ju-
risdiction over genocide is Article 20(a). Id.
' See Working Group Report, supra note 2, Commentary, Addendum 1, at 21-22.
Article VI of the Genocide Convention provides that individuals charged with genocide
may be tried by a competent state tribunal or "such international penal tribunal as may
have jurisdiction .... " Genocide Convention, supra note 14, at art. VI, S. REP. No.
2, at 9; 78 U.N.T.S. at 281-82. For an excellent overview of the development of the
Convention and its terms, see Matthew Lippman, The 1948 Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Forty-Five Years Later, 1 TEMPLE
INT'L & COMP. L. J. 1 (1994).
S The general provision for subject matter jurisdiction over treaty crimes is Article
20(e).
" This distinction may not be entirely accurate. This author would argue that the
international offense of apartheid, which is listed as a treaty crime in the Statute, is
also an offense under general international law. Like genocide, the presence of a
comprehensive convention pertaining to apartheid should not obscure the fact that the
offense exists generally, regardless of a given state's accession to the convention. This
was also the view of a minority of members of the I.L.C. Working Group. See
Working Group Report, supra note 2, Commentary, Addendum 1, at 27. This categori-
zation distinction is critically important for the purposes of the principle of non-retroac-
228 [Vol. 28:221
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Convention,' the Montreal Convention on Aircraft Hijacking," and the
"grave breaches" sections of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.42 While the
unfinished Draft Code of Crimes is naturally not included, it is expected
to be added to the list if and when it is completed.43 The I.L.C. Court
would acquire jurisdiction in a case under this head according to the
same state consent procedure that is set out in (I), above.
(V) IN THE EVENT OF SECURITY CoUNCIL ACTION UNDER CHAPTER
VII, the requirements of state consent and state complaint set out above
would not apply.' Acquisition of jurisdiction by this avenue would place
the I.L.C. Court in essentially the same position as the ad hoc tribunals
convened by the Security Council for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
The operative provision is Chapter VII, which requires the compliance of
all state parties to the U.N. Charter, and accordingly, their compliance
with all operations and orders of the I.L.C. Court when acting under
Chapter VII authority.45 The sole restriction imposed by the proposed
Statute is that the I.L.C. Court would continue to be restricted to hearing.
cases within the subject-matter scope set out in Article 20. In other
words, if the Security Council desired the adjudication of international
crimes outside the five offense groupings described above, other fora
tivity, which is stated in Article 39. See discussion infra part C.2.
' International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243.
" Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, 23 Sept. 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177.
' Collectively, the Geneva Conventions define grave breaches as willful killing,
torture, or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; willfully causing great
suffering or serious injury to body or health; extensive destruction and appropriation of
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
compelling a prisoner of war or civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile Power,
willfully depriving a prisoner of war or civilian of the rights of fair and regular trial;
unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement; and the taking of hostages.
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field of 12 August, 1949, art. 50, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 3146, 75 U.N.T.S. 31,
62; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick &
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of 12 August, 1949, art. 51, 6 U.S.T.
3217, 3250, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 116; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War of 12 August, 1949, art. 130, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 3250, 75 U.N.T.S. 135,
238; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
of 12 August, 1949, art. 147, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3618, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 388. See also
1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949 (Protocol 1),
June 8, 1977, art. 85, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 42.
3 See Working Group Report, supra note 2, Commentary, Addendum 1, at 28-29.
See Working Group Report, supra note 2, 1994 Draft Statute, at art. 23.
4 U.N. CHARTER, arts. 25, 48, 49.
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would have to be considered - perhaps even the establishment of
another international tribunal on an ad hoc basis.
III. APPLYING THE PRINCIPLES AND OBJECrIVES OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW
With all the convulsions in global society, only one power is left that
can impose order on incipient chaos. It is the power of principles
transcending changing perceptions of expediency.'
While "incipient chaos" would be an unfairly damning description of
the evolution of international criminal law, there could scarcely be a more
appropriate label for its institutional management than "changing per-
ceptions of expediency." Since the end of the Second World War, the
international legal community has lurched from crisis to crisis in sporadic
attempts to develop and adjudicate international criminal law. This lack
of direction or coherent strategy is at least partly attributable to a general
failure to identify and abide by fundamental principles and objectives in
international criminal law. In particular, the four ad hoc criminal tribunals
have been the very embodiments of expediency, motivated much more by
what was politically possible than by any sense of legal principle. In an
attempt to attach anchors to a project that has spent the last fifty years in
haphazard drift, this Article argues that international criminal law tribu-
nals, including the I.L.C. Court, must be measured against the following
four principles and two objectives of international criminal law.
These six criteria have been selected on the basis of their relation-
ship to the jurisdictional structure of an international criminal tribunal, as
well as their normative force within international criminal law. Obviously,
there are other principles that play important roles in international crimi-
nal prosecutions - the presumption of innocence and the right to coun-
sel, to name two - but it is the following six principles and objectives
that bear directly on the form the jurisdictional structure of an internation-
al criminal tribunal should take.
A. Individual Criminal Responsibility
There is no question that individual criminal responsibility is the pre-
eminent principle of international criminal law. Although it was already
part of international law by the end of the Second World War, it was
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Statement at the Security Council
Summit Meeting (Jan. 31, 1992), in 3 THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM: GENERAL COURSE ON PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 189 (Hague Acad. of Int'l L. No. 240, 1993).
230 [Vol. 28:221
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greatly clarified and strengthened as a legal principle in the Charter and
Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.47 Individu-
al criminal responsibility has been applied as a principle of international
law on numerous occasions in both domestic and international criminal
prosecutions in the half-century since Nuremberg." It is also reflected in
several conventions pertaining to discrete offenses under international
law.49 The connection between individual criminal responsibility as a
principle of law and the jurisdictional structure of an international crimi-
nal tribunal is obvious. The personal jurisdiction (ratione personae) of the
tribunal must include natural persons. Perhaps not surprisingly, the 1994
I.L.C. Draft Statute, as well as all previous court proposals considered in
this Article, satisfies this requirement. The more interesting observation is
that the I.L.C. Draft Statute joins the U.N. Draft Statute (1953), I.L.A.
Proposal (1982), Siracusa Proposal (1990), A.B.A. Proposal (1991) in
limiting the personal jurisdiction of the court to natural persons. In
contrast, Sottile (1951) and Bassi6uni (1987) proposed extending interna-
tional criminal liability to corporations, organizations, and states. Con-
ceptually, the I.L.C. approach is the correct one. Attaching criminal
responsibility to non-individual actors would raise numerous practical
problems, particularly with respect to the likelihood of voluntary state
accession and eventual enforcement. More importantly, the principles and
objectives that underpin international criminal law flow directly from legal
rights held by individuals, not states or organizations. As Bassi6uni
himself concedes, the precedents and conventions that comprise interna-
tional criminal law clearly indicate that international criminal responsibili-
4 See I.M.T. Charter, supra note 9, art. 6, and INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
(NUREMBERG) JUDGMENT, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMuNALS: PROCEEDINGS 27
AUG.-1 OCT. 1946, at 411, 466-67 (1971) [hereinafter I.M.T. JUDGMENT]. Individual
criminal responsibility was the first principle identified by the I.L.C. in its Formulation
of the Nuremberg Principles. Report of the International Law Commission on its Second
Session, 5 June to 29 July, 1950, reprinted in 44 AM. J. INT'L. L. 105, 126-34 (Supp.
1950). For a pre-Nuremberg view of individual criminal responsibility, see Hans Kelsen,
Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with Particular Regard to
the Punishment of War Criminals, 31 CAL. L. REV. 530, 534-36 (1942-43).
'4 For a domestic case, see Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18
(Isr. Dist. Ct. 1961), afj'd, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Isr. S. Ct.). Internationally, the tribunals pres-
ently operating in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are excellent examples of the
principle at work. See Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development
of International Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 79 (1994).
' See, e.g., Genocide Convention, supra note 14, at art. VI, S. REP. No. 2, at 9;
78 U.N.T.S. at 281-82 (providing that persons charged with genocide may be tried by
an international penal tribunal).
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ty is fundamentally individual50 Even where offenses are committed at
the behest of organizations or under the guise of state policy, they are
committed by individuals, and it is individuals to whom criminal law is
addressed. The ruling of the I.M.T. at Nuremberg on this point is espe-
cially germane:
Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract
entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can
the provisions of international law be enforced'
Similarly, Franck warns against losing the focus on the individual in the
development of international criminal law:
This new emphasis on international law's capacity to assign responsibili-
ty to individuals must be understood as parallelling the growth of
international legal rights of individuals. The growth of human rights of
persons inevitably goes along with the growth of persons' responsibility
for human wrongs, even when committed under the colour of State
authority. 2
This is not to say that states do not play a large role in the commis-
sion of certain offenses or that the role played is excusable. Rather,
international criminal law is not the appropriate legal vehicle to address
state action that facilitates or induces the criminal acts of individuals.
Brownlie states that it is not illogical to prosecute an individual, but not
the participant state, for an "act of state" that constitutes a criminal
offense: criminal law is concerned with the physical act and state of mind
of the individual, not the legal character of the state's action, which is
wholly different. 3 International fora other than an international criminal
court, notably the Security Council or International Court of Justice, are
more suited to addressing the wrongful acts of states.
In recognizing the role uniquely played by states in one specific
offense, aggression, the 1994 I.L.C. Draft Statute represents a marked
improvement over past proposals. 4 Analogous to the offense known at
Nuremberg and Tokyo as "crimes against peace," the crime of aggression
10 BASSIOuNI, DRAFT CODE AND STATUTE, supra note 6, at 51-52.
s, I.M.T. JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 466-67.
52 3 THOMAs M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND INSTnTU-
TIONAL SYSTEM: GENERAL COURSE ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 246 (Hague Acad.
of Int'l L. No. 240, 1993) [hereinafter FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL AND INsTITTnIONAL SYSTEM].
3 IAN BROWNLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 166
(1963).
14 See Working Group Report, supra note 4, Commentary, Addendum 1, at 22-23.
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is entirely a servant of state action: briefly stated, it is the use of armed
force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political
independence of another state.55 The necessity for state involvement is
obvious. Nevertheless, the I.L.C. remained true to the principle of indi-
vidual criminal responsibility by including the offense of aggression in the
subject matter of the Statute. The fact that a Security Council determina-
tion would be required in order to prosecute under this head is not in-
compatible with the general principle, but merely reflects the nature of
the offense itself. The balance struck by the I.L.C. on this point is
commendable.
B. Non-retroactivity
The principle of non-retroactivity is more precisely a composite of
several separate principles of criminal law, although their exact distinc-
tions will not play large roles in this analysis. The primary principle is
known by the maxim nullum crimen sine lege, or no crime without a
law; that is, a person can not be charged with an offense unless that
offense existed in law at the time of the act. This encompasses the close
corollary principle of the prohibition against the retroactive (ex post facto)
application of criminal sanction; that is, laws can not be created after an
act to make it criminal5 6 As evidenced by over a century of convention-
al law and customary state practice, nullum crimen is the core principle
of substantive international criminal law. Judicially, it was acknowl-
edged by the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, although distinguished
from the facts in those cases,58 and it was recognized by the Permanent
" Designed as a guide for Security Council use, the complete definition is stated
in Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314(XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 2319th
mtg., Annex, Agenda Item 86, Supp. No. 31, at 143, U.N. Doc. No. A/9631 (1974).
Note that this definition concerns aggression by states only, and was not intended to
define the offense as it may apply to individuals. It is used here only to provide a
general picture of the nature of the offense. Id.
5 M. CHERIF BAssIOUN, CRImES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAWI 113-14 (1992) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANrrY]. See also
Heman S. Burgos, The Application of International Humanitarian Law as Compared to
Human Rights Law in Situations of Internal Armed Conflict, Internal Disturbances and
Tensions, or Public Emergency, with Special Reference to War Crimes and Political
Crimes, in IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL HuMANITARIAN LAW 1, 11 (Frits
Kalshoven et al. eds., 1989).
7 BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 56, at 110-12. Please note,
however, that Bassi6uni prefers to frame the principle as nullum crimen sine iure, or
no crime without good reason, a departure this author cannot endorse 'and, in any
event, a distinction which is irrelevant for the purposes of this discussion.
"' I.M.T. Judgment, supra note 47, at 461-62; SOLIS HORwrrz, THE TOKYO TRIAL
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Court of International Justice in Danzig Legislative Decrees.9 Domesti-
cally, it has been recognized as a principle of justice on numerous
occasions in various states.' No criminal law principle has been incorpo-
rated into more international resolutions and instruments than nullum
crimen sine lege; Article 15 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant is
representative of the codified principle:
1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of
any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under
national or international law at the time when it was committed ....
2. Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of
any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was
committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law
recognized by the community of nations.6
Part 5 of the 1994 I.L.C. Draft Statute provides for the operation of
the trial and the rights of the accused. Article 39 incorporates the princi-
ple of nullum crimen sine lege in a manner that differentiates between
"crimes under general international law" (the first four offense groupings)
and "treaty crimes" (the fifth offense grouping). Here the effect of the
475, 548 (Int'l Conciliation, Vol. No. 465, 1950). While recognizing nullum crimen as
a principle of law, both tribunals rejected defense submissions that laws were being
applied retroactively in these cases. However, one dissent was filed on this point in the
Tokyo Judgment. Id.
" Note that this advisory opinion was confined to domestic constitutional inter-
pretation, not public international law per se. Nevertheless, the Court stated that "it
must be possible for the individual to know, beforehand, whether his acts are lawful
or liable to punishment." Advisory Opinion No. 65, Consistency of Certain Danzig
Legislative Decrees with the Constitution of the Free City, 1935 P.C.IJ. (Ser. A/B),
No. 65, at 57.
60 See, e.g., R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, 709 (Can.) (separate opinion of Cory,
J.) ("The rule against retroactive legislation is a principle of justice"). For the Canadian
constitutional guarantee of non-retroactive criminal sanction, see CAN. CONST. (Constitu-
tion Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 11(g) [hereinafter
Canadian Charter].
61 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter I.C.C.P.R.]. See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217A(Iff), U.N. GAOR, at art. 11, 2, U.N. Doc. No. A/811 (1948), reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS OF THE UNrrED NATIONS 1948-1982, at
6 (UNIFO ed., 1983); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War of 12 August, 1949, art. 99, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3392, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 210; 1977
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949 (Protocol I), June
8, 1977, art. 6, 2(c), 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 614; and European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 7, 213
U.N.T.S. 222, 228 [hereinafter European Human Rights Convention].
234 [Vol. 28:221
JURISDICTIONAL STRUCTURE
classification of offenses such as genocide and apartheid becomes espe-
cially clear. as we shall see, in comparison to crimes under general
international law, treaty crimes would face much higher hurdles for ap-
plicability under Article 39 before they would fall within the jurisdiction
of the LL.C. Court.
Article 39 states that a person could not be found guilty of a crime
under general international law unless the act or omission charged consti-
tuted a crime at the time it occurred. This provision reflects the fact that
the first four offense groupings are generally applicable in substance to all
states, with the only applicability concern being the relationship in time
between the birth of the legal proscription and the act or omission in
question. In respect of crimes under general international law, Article 39
completely satisfies the demands of nullum crimen sine lege. At the same
time, it is broad enough to permit the prosecution of offenses under the
general principles of law as recognized by the community of nations,
prosecutorial flexibility which is expressly allowed under Article 15(2) of
the Civil and Political Rights Covenant.
In respect of treaty crimes, the danger of retroactive application is
considerably greater. These offenses are not generally applicable, but
instead depend upon the consensual accession of states for their substan-
tive application. The proscriptions contained in a certain treaty apply only
in those states that are party to that treaty and have subsequently incorpo-
rated it into their domestic law. Therefore, unless the act or omission
charged occurred in one of these treaty states, laying the charge would
amount to creating a criminal offense without law - precisely the evil
fought by nullum crimen sine lege. Article 39 provides protection by
stating that no person could be found guilty of a treaty crime unless the
treaty in question was applicable to the conduct of the accused at the
time the act or omission charged occurred. The practical result is that
there are two conditions imposed on treaty crimes, time and territorial
applicability: that is, at the time of the offense, the state in which the
alleged offense occurred would have to have been party to the relevant
treaty and the offense charged would have to have been incorporated into
that state's domestic law.62 The legal result is that the principle of
nullum crimen sine lege is wholly fulfilled by Article 39.
On this footing, the 1994 I.L.C. Draft Statute compares favorably
with past proposals, all of which made careful attempts to avoid the
retroactivity concerns of Nuremberg and Tokyo. Like the I.L.A. (1982)
and A.B.A. (1991) proposals, the Statute provides for subject matter
62 Interestingly, the position of the accused's country of nationality under the treaty
is irrelevant. Working Group Report, supra note 2, Commentary, Addendum 2, at 18.
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jurisdiction - at least in part - through a list of named treaties. As a
natural consequence of the separation of international criminal code and
international criminal court projects within the I.L.C., the Statute has
emerged as a flat rejection of the code-based approaches of Sottile (1951)
and Bassi6uni (1987). For a variety of reasons, the I.L.C.'s decision to
proceed with a court proposal prior to the completion of the long-delayed
Draft Code of Crimes was wisely made. The arguments advanced by
Bassiruni and Sottile in favor of a code-based international criminal court
pertain almost exclusively to the need to fulfil the principle of nullum
crimen sine lege: absent an international code of crimes, there would be
no systematic way of avoiding the retroactive application of offenses;
moreover, substantive criminal law would be characterized by uncertainty
and vagueness such that nullum crimen would be undermined.63 These
arguments are invalid and potentially counter-productive to the respective
success of both code and court.
The question of the necessity of an international criminal code must
be approached with a realistic appreciation of the role of criminal codes
in domestic affairs, for it is often a domestic lawyer's yearning for textual
certainty that gives an international code its appeal. Even in states that
rely heavily upon domestic criminal codes, the substantive criminal law
reaches far beyond the boundaries of the code. Illustrative of this is
Canada, where the principal source of criminal law is the Criminal
Code." In reality, this is only the principal statutory source, and even
among statutes, it is only one of many. The Narcotic Control Act,' the
Young Offenders Act,' and a host of regulatory statutes are several
examples of the myriad legislative sources of criminal offenses in Canada.
Moreover, even the simplest case of a prosecution under the Criminal
Code invokes other sources of law. Despite the abolition of common law
offenses by section 9(a) of the Code, Canadian criminal law is still
heavily dependent on the common law for statutory interpretation that, in
some cases, is far more significant than the bare codified text. As Colvin
advises, "[i]n this sense, the Canadian code is only a partial codifica-
tion."
Recall that it is certainty in the creation and application of offenses,
and the corollary guarantee of non-retroactivity, that the international code
proponents seek. If codification in the domestic arena, with its greater
degree of institutional and substantive legal homogeneity, is incapable of
6 See BASSIOUNI, DRAFT CODE AND STATUTE, supra note 6, at 9.
Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. ch. C-46 (1993) (Can.).
Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C., ch. N-i (1993) (Can.).
Young Offenders Act, R.S.C., ch. Y-1 (1993) (Can.).
67 ERic COLVIN, PRINCIPLES OF CRAMINAL LAW, 19-24 (2d ed. 1991).
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providing this certainty, it is a safe assumption that international criminal
codification will fail on this ground as well.' While codification may
have the potential to contribute to legal certainty, any claim of inherent
or complete certainty must be rejected. This argument should not be taken
to mean, however, that the international system can be closely analogized
to the domestic. There are many obvious differences between the two
systems which, if anything, speak against the need for an international
code. Justice La Forest of the Supreme Court of Canada persuasively
states the lessons of the domestic/international comparison on this point:
The nature of a decentralized international system is such that interna-
tional law cannot be conveniently codified in some sort of transnational
code. Its differing sources may alarm some strict legal positivists, but al-
most all international lawyers now recognize that such a crude analogy
to the requirements of a domestic law system is simplistic ....
[E]ven though there is no codification, international law can nevertheless
be determined. Given our common law tradition, we should be used to
finding the law in a number of disparate sources.6
Contrary to the claims of Bassi6uni and others, the principle of
nullum crimen sine lege is not contingent on codification. International
criminal law is already sufficiently certain to satisfy this principle.
Avoiding the retroactive application of criminal law would be better
served by creating a permanent judicial institution to guide the develop-
ment of the law than by a continued preoccupation with its codifica-
tion.7" Instead, proponents of an international criminal code should wel-
63 Some scholars warn that the international codification project endangers the
integrity of the entire system. If ready agreement on all issues in the code is not
reached, the continued validity of those rules in customary international law may be
cast in doubt. For an excellent discussion of this fear and the so-called "Martens
Clause" as an attempted solution, see Georges Abi-Saab, The Specificities of Humanitar-
ian Law, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANrTARIAN LAW AND RED
CROSS PRINCn'LES IN HONOUR OF JEAN PIcrETr 265, 274 (Christophe Swinarski ed.,
1984).
1 R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. at 782, 785. Also in this case, Justice Cory
expressly rejected the argument that the absence of codification renders international
criminal law uncertain. "In my view, the fact that the entire body of international law
is not codified and that reference must be made to opinions of experts and legal
writing in interpreting it does not in itself make the legislation vague or uncertain." R.
v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. at 867-68 (Justice Cory referring to the Canadian Criminal
Code, R.S.C. ch. 46, § 7(3.71) (1993), which incorporates the international offenses of
war crimes and crimes against humanity into Canadian law).
70 Brownlie notes that, in the absence of a single international criminal court,
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come the creation of an international court, for it would contribute to the
eventual success of the code project. The establishment of an international
court would facilitate the uniform and consistent development of interna-
tional criminal law, which would correspondingly enhance the possibility
of securing agreement on the provisions of the Draft Code." The views
of a former president of the International Association of Penal Law go
significantly beyond mere facilitation or enhancement; Graven asserts that
an international criminal court is a necessary precondition to an interna-
tional criminal code:
As long as there is no judicial organ for the trial of international crimes,
there will be neither a serious codification of international criminal law
nor any serious application of an international sanction. The world will
go on living in a judicial anarchy under violence and injustice with the
risk of running into destruction7
In light of the false promise of certainty offered by codification, and
the ability of uncodified international law to satisfy the principle of
nullum crimen sine lege, the court project must not be forced to queue
behind the long-delayed draft code. As the I.L.C. has wisely decided, the
merits of an international court stand on their own terms, independent of
a code and perhaps even capable of contributing to its eventual success.
C. Judicial Independence
In any legal system, domestic or international, judicial independence
is the principal guarantee of the rule of law. 3 It is the touchstone of
freedom under the law and a critical bulwark against political interference
in the judicial process.74 As a safeguard for judicial impartiality, judicial
international crimes must be defined meticulously in order to prevent charges of
retroactivity and to avoid discrepancies between ad hoc tribunals, thus suggesting that
a permanent international court would contribute to the precision and clarity of
substantive law. BROWNUE, supra note 53, at 207.
7, Scharf, supra note 15, at 157.
This statement was made in response to a questionnaire sent to eminent jurists
in 1948 by the International Association of Penal Law and the International Bar
Association. See SoTrI.E, supra note 3, at 55.
" See Jules Deschenes, Toward an Independent Judiciary: Canadian and Interna-
tional Perspectives, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 514, 514
(Shimon Shetreet & Jules Deschenes eds., 1985).
74 See Ninian M. Stephen, in Judicial Independence-A Fragile Bastion, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 529, 530 (Shimon Shetreet & Jules
Deschenes eds., 1985) For excellent discussions of judicial independence in two
domestic constitutional contexts, American and Canadian respectively, see Irving R.
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independence helps to ensure the fair adjudication of the rights and claims
at stake in any given case, that is, the right to a fair trial." Therefore,
in a sense, without giving effect to the principle of judicial independence,
our recognition of other principles and objectives in international criminal
law may come to naught. Judicial independence has been incorporated
into numerous international and domestic conventions and resolutions. Of-
ten, as typified by Article 14, para. 1 of the Civil and Political Rights
Covenant, the principle of judicial independence is combined with the
right to a fair trial in a single codified guarantee:
All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the deter-
nmination of any criminal charge against him . . . everyone shall be
entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and
impartial tribunal established by law ... 76
Institutional independence, which includes not only financial indepen-
dence but also a court's general administrative independence from the
political function of government, is a large component of overall judicial
independence.' The degree of institutional independence enjoyed by an
international criminal court will be largely determined by jurisdictional
factors. For example, a court that is too closely obligated to political
Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 671 (1980); and
MARTIN L. FRIEDLAND, A PLACE APART: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND ACCoUNTABiu-
TY IN CANADA (1995).
' The Supreme Court of Canada recently made explicit the correlation between
judicial independence and impartial adjudication in R. v. Lippe, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 114,
116-17 (Can.).
76 I.C.C.P.R., supra note 61, at art. 14, TI, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176. See also Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, supra note 61, at art. 10; European Human Rights Con-
vention, supra note 61, at art. 6, 213 U.N.T.S. at 228; U.N. DEP'T OF INT'L ECONOMIC
& SOCIAL AFFAIRS, SEvENTH UNITED NATIONS CONGRESS ON THE PREVENTION OF
CRImE AND THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.121/22/Rev.1, at
58-62, U.N. Sales No. E.86.IV.1 (1986) (setting forth basic principles on the indepen-
dence of the judiciary). For a domestic view, see Canadian Charter, supra note 60,
§ 11(d).
' See Shimon Shetreet, Judicial Independence: New Conceptual Dimensions and
Contemporary Challenges, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE
590, 598 (Shimon Shetreet & Jules Deschenes eds., 1985); Jonathan T. Fried, Improving
of [sic] the Administration of Justice in the Americas: Report on Protection and Guar-
antees for Judges and Lawyers in the Exercise of Their Functions, in REPORT OF THE
INTm-AMEICAN JURIDICAL COMMITTEE ON "IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE IN THE AMERICAS: PROTECTION AND GUARANTEES FOR JUDGES AND
LAWYERS IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR FUNCTIONS" 3, 20-25, CJI/SO/IUdoe.42/94 rev.2
(1994).
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actors, whether those are the Security Council, the General Assembly, or
individual states, would find its institutional independence compromised.
Canadian courts have held that it is unacceptable for an external force to
be in a position to interfere in matters which are directly and immediately
relevant to the adjudicative function. Furthermore, they have held the test
of judicial independence to be whether an informed and reasonable person
would perceive the tribunal as being independent, not whether that person
can prove actual interference. 8 Because a similar test in international
law has not yet emerged, the Canadian test will be employed as a rough
aspirational standard for the present project.
In its approach to the 1994 Draft Statute, the I.L.C. has taken two
critical steps toward ensuring judicial independence. First, it has rejected
the ad hoc approach to establishing international tribunals in favor of
creating a permanent international criminal court. The incompatibility
between temporarily constituted judicial bodies and judicial independence
is widely acknowledged: simply put, courts that are not permanent are too
vulnerable to political manipulation, including outright termination, to be
truly independent. Domestically, the rule against ad hoc tribunals is a
fundamental principle of law in over twenty countries; Shetreet goes so
far as to call this rule "an imperative prerequisite of an independent
judicial system." 9 Internationally, concerns about judicial independence
and impartiality have led to the dissolution of an important ad hoc
tribunal in the past. This was the primary reason for the abandonment of
the "permanent" Court of Arbitration in favor of the (truly) Permanent
Court of International Justice, now the International Court of Justice.'
Yet, as uncontentious as the rule against ad hoc tribunals may seem, it
has been violated on four celebrated occasions this century. The I.L.C.
promises not to repeat this error in principle.
The I.L.C.'s second step toward ensuring judicial independence was
its choice of multilateral treaty as the means by which the Court would
be implemented. Regardless of the improvements over Nuremberg and
Tokyo that were made in the construction of the tribunals in the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, these latter courts are no less creatures of
political expediency than their post-war predecessors. The reasons are
legion why the trials held at Nuremberg and Tokyo are stained by the
label "victors' justice," all of which combine to present a stinging indict-
ment of the independence of that judicial process.8' In spite of precau-
R. v. Genereux, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 259, 261-63 (Can.).
7' Shetreet, supra note 77, at 615-16.
'0 See D.W. Bowrr, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTrrTUiONS 255-73 (4th ed.
1982). Contrary to its name, of course, the Permanent Court of Arbitration was an ad
hoc body. Id.
s The constitutive documents for the two post-war tribunals were unilaterally
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tions that have been taken to better ensure the rights of the accused in
the Yugoslav and Rwandan prosecutions, these present-day tribunals find
their institutional independence compromised, primarily due to their
relationship with the Security Council. Like Nuremberg and Tokyo, this
is a case of great powers deciding when and how to conduct international
criminal prosecutions, and then creating judicial bodies that are obligated
to them. At any time, the Security Council can unilaterally revise or
terminate the judicial processes underway in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda; in other words, the Council is in a position to interfere in
matters directly and immediately relevant to the adjudicative function, a
situation that is unacceptable in domestic Canadian law.'
This sorry state would have been replicated under a permanent
international criminal court if the I.L.C. had chosen the Security Council
method of implementation. In contrast, establishment by multilateral treaty
is much more conducive to judicial independence. The influence of
individual states to interfere in the judicial process would be dispersed
across the collection of states parties. The Security Council would retain
a peripheral influence through the coordination of Chapter VII of the
Charter and Article 23 of the Draft Statute, but this is no more power
than the Council currently holds through Chapter VII itself. In any event,
it is expected that the bulk of the I.L.C. Court's work would be consen-
sual submission cases, not Security Council referrals, and making the
Court available to the Council was understandably seen by the I.L.C. as
preferable to the continued creation of separate ad hoc tribunals by the
Council. 3
A final appraisal of the degree of judicial independence to be
enjoyed by the I.L.C. Court must await future agreement on the Court's
relationship to the United Nations. Beyond its origin in a multilateral
treaty, the Court could be specifically constituted in a number of different
ways: as a principal organ of the United Nations, which would require an
amendment to the Charter, as a secondary organ of the United Nations,
which would not require an amendment; as an organ outside the United
Nations but related by agreement; or as an organ outside the United
drafted by Allied forces, the judges and prosecutors were drawn exclusively from Allied
states, and, criminal proceedings were conducted only against German and Japanese
officials. The two courts have suffered widespread criticism because of bias, pre-
judgment of guilt, unclean hands, and interference with the prosecution. See BASSIOUNI,
CRIMEs AGAINST HuMANrrY supra note 56, at 115-17; Scharf, supra note 15, at 138;
Onuma Yasuaki, The Tokyo Trial: Between Law and Politics, in THE TOKYO WAR
CRIM TRAL: AN INTERNATONAL SYMPOSuIM 45 (C. Hosoya et al., eds., 1986).
Genereux, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 263-64.
Working Group Report, supra note 2, Commentary, Addendum 1, at 33.
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Nations but related by a resolution of a U.N. organ. 4 Each alternative
presents different implications for judicial independence. For example, the
closer the relationship between the Court and the United Nations, the
greater its potential financial security because the tribunal would not be
required to solicit funds from states parties directly; however, as the on-
going funding crises of the Yugoslav tribunal indicates, even a close
relationship is no guarantee of stable financial support.' As usual, the
devil is in the details. Nevertheless, with its multilateral treaty approach,
the I.L.C. Draft Statute has begun on solid ground in respect of judicial
independence.
D. Double Jeopardy
This general principle has several different names. American lawyers
call it double jeopardy protection. English lawyers refer to the special
pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict. Canadian law characterizes
it as the rule against multiple convictions (the so-called Kienapple rule).
Continental and international lawyers employ the phrase non bis in
idem. This Article will follow the international law tradition of non bis
in idem, and it will stand in the shoes of all conceptualizations of the
broader principle: nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa, or no
one should be twice harassed for one and the same cause. In simplest
terms, the principle of non bis in idem ensures that there is finality to
judicial proceedings once all avenues of appeal have been exhausted.
Without it, an accused person could be subjected to the fundamental
unfairness of repeated prosecutions for the same act, theoretically con-
tinuing indefinitely until a conviction is securedY
There is no question that non bis in idem is a fundamental principle
of international criminal law. It has been known in domestic law since
8 These options are briefly discussed in Appendix II of the Working Group Report,
supra note 2. The report does not recommend any one option, although the first
alternative of principal organ by amendment appears to be the least favored.
' See Julian J.E. Schutte, Legal and Practical Implications, from the Perspective of
the Host Country, Relating to the Establishment of the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L. FORUM 423, 425-26 (1994).
6 MARTiN L. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 359-74 (1969) [hereinafter FRMDLAND,
DOUBLE JEOPARDY]. The Canadian rule takes its name from Kienapple v. R., 44
D.L.R.3d 351 (Can., 1974). In Kienapple, the defendant had been convicted of rape and
unlawful sexual intercourse with a female under the age of 14, both stemming from the
same incident. The Canadian Supreme Court held that the offenses "overlapped," and
that "[t]here cannot be multiple convictions from the same delict . . . ." Id. at 352.
' See Walter T. Fisher, Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties and the Intruding Con-
stitution, 28 U. Cmu. L. REv. 591, 592 (1961).
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the twelfth century and is now guaranteed in the domestic legal systems
of almost every state."8 The principal expression of non bis in idem in
conventional international law is Article 14, para. 7 of the Civil and
Political Rights Covenant:
No one shall be liable to be tried or punished for an offence for which
he has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with
the law and penal procedure of each country. 9
Article 42 of the 1994 LL.C. Draft Statute provides for the guarantee
of non bis in idem. This Article borrows heavily from the double jeopar-
dy provisions in the statutes of the Yugoslav and Rwandan tribunals.'
Articles 48 to 50, which provide for appeal and review, also have signifi-
cant double jeopardy implications; appeal and review will be discussed
after the section on double jeopardy issues between different proceedings.
1. Double Jeopardy Between Different Proceedings
The effect of the double jeopardy guarantee between different
proceedings in Article 42 can be summarized in the following manner.
SITUATION 1: Where a prosecution before another court follows a
final order of the LL.C. Court, the order of the I.L.C. Court would
operate as a complete bar to the second trial. While the article itself
speaks in terms of first and subsequent "trials," the commentary indicates
that the article's intended concern is more precisely final orders or
determinations on the merits of a case. For example, a first trial that was
held but terminated before a final order was issued would not operate to
bar a second proceeding.9' "Another court" refers to any court other than
83 See FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, supra note 86, at 3, 6, 358; JAY A. SIGLER,
DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY 120-54
(1969); Res. in Int'l L., Harv. L. Sch., Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect
to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L. L. (Supp.) 437, at 602-12 (1935) (setting forth art. 13, non
bis in idem, with commentary) [hereinafter Harvard Research]. For the Canadian per-
spective, see Canadian Charter, supra note 60, § 11(h); and Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch.
C-46, §§ 7(6), 12, 607(6) (1993) (Can.). The U.S. Constitution states: "[N]or shall any
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb
." U.S. CONST., amend. V.
I.C.C.P.R., supra note 61, at art. 14, 7, 999 U.N.T.S. at 177. See also Conven-
tion Between Member States of the European Communities on Double Jeopardy. May
25, 1987, art. 1, 20 E.C. BULL No. 5, at 114 (1988) [hereinafter E.C. Double Jeopardy
Convention] (articulating the same principle).
' See Yugoslav Statute, supra note 11, at art. 10, 32 I.L.M. at 1177; Rwandan
Statute, supra note 12, at art. 9, 33 I.L.M. at 1605.
", Working Group Report, supra note 2, Commentary, Addendum 2, at 21.
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the I.L.C. Court; therefore, subsequent proceedings before domestic courts
or other international tribunals would be barred by a final order previous-
ly issued by the I.L.C. Court.
SrrUATION 2: Where a final order before another court precedes
prosecution before the I.L.C. Court, the Draft Statute mirrors the Yugo-
slav and Rwandan provisions. The second trial (that is, the I.L.C. Court
trial) would be permissible, but only in two occasions: first, if the act(s)
in question had been characterized at the first trial as "an ordinary crime"
and not a crime within the jurisdiction of the I.L.C. Court; or second, if
the first trial had not been impartial or independent, or had been designed
to shield the accused from international criminal responsibility, or had not
been diligently prosecuted - that is, if the first trial had been "a sham."
In the event that the second trial were to proceed to conviction and
sentencing, the I.L.C. Court would have to take into account the penalty
already served by the convicted person in respect of the first trial.
SrruATION 3: In the case of multiple proceedings before the LL.C.
Court itself, the Draft Statute is curiously silent. There is no provision
prohibiting the Court itself from trying a person more than once in
respect of the same act or acts.
The foregoing double jeopardy guarantee improves upon the protec-
tion in past proposals in a number of ways. Unlike the U.N. Draft Statute
(1953) and the I.L.A. Proposal (1982), the 1994 I.L.C. Draft Statute
contemplates proceedings in non-contracting states in structuring the
guarantee. For example, even if the first trial had occurred in a state that
was not a state party to the Statute, the I.L.C. Court would still be bound
to exercise the restraint set out in situation 2 above. The Statute also
surpasses the Yugoslav and Rwandan tribunal statutes in that they con-
templated only domestic courts in their guarantees. In contrast, Article 42
encompasses "any other court" in its attempts to avoid double jeopardy
situations. For example, in situation 1 above, a final order of the I.L.C.
Court would bar subsequent proceedings in any other judicial forum,
domestic or international.
While the absolute bar on subsequent proceedings in situation 1 is
commendable, the incomplete protection afforded in situations 2 and 3
raises important questions about the proper scope of non bis in idem in
international law. Of the two situations, number 3 is the most easily
addressed. The lack of a prohibition against multiple trials before the
I.L.C. Court in respect of the same act or acts is a direct challenge to
non bis in idem. The danger of an accused person being put in jeopardy
more than once for the same act is exacerbated by the considerable
overlap between the different offenses that form the subject matter
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jurisdiction of the Court.' For example, the act of torture against civil-
ians during armed conflict constitutes an offense under several heads of
jurisdiction enumerated in the Draft Statute, including crimes against
humanity," the "grave breaches" sections of the Geneva Conventions,94
and the Torture Convention itself.95 Conceivably, the same person could
be charged and prosecuted before the I.L.C. Court several different times
for different offenses, all arising out of the same act of torture. The
statutes of the two existing international criminal tribunals are similarly
deficient, and the Yugoslav Statute has been criticized by the American
Bar Association for this reason.' Therefore, the I.L.C. is strongly urged
to revise Article 42 of the Draft Statute to explicitly bar multiple pro-
ceedings before the LL.C. Court in respect of the same act or acts.
The situation presented in situation number 2, that of proceedings in
the LL.C. Court following the final order of another court, is considerably
more difficult. Recall that the motivating principle underlying non bis in
idem is the belief that no one should be twice harassed for one and the
same cause. An accused person has the right to expect finality to judicial
proceedings once all avenues of appeal have been exhausted. The question
is whether, properly interpreted, non bis in idem should permit a second
trial and, if so, on what grounds.
A brief consideration of the law pertaining to multiple criminal
proceedings between domestic courts may assist our analysis of this
question. Not surprisingly, the academic literature and case law on
interjurisdictional double jeopardy issues is restricted to relations between
states, and does not contemplate international tribunals that, to date, have
not existed on any sustained basis. While a state is not bound, in the
absence of treaty, to recognize the penal claim of another state for the
n See Working Group Report, supra note 2, Commentary, Addendum 1, at 20.
9 See Working Group Report, supra note 2, 1994 Draft Statute, at art. 20(d).
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 are included in the list of treaties in the Annex
and enter the jurisdiction of the Court through Article 20(e). Id. at art 20(e). Specif-
ically, the torture of civilians is an offense pursuant to Article 147 of the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3618, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 388.
9S Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, S. TREATY Doc. No. 20, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1994); 23 I.L.M.
1027 (1984), modified by 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985). The Convention enters the Court's
jurisdiction through Article 20(e) of the 1994 Draft Statute, Working Group Report,
supra note 2.
96 SPECIAL TASK FORCE OF THE A.B.A. SECTION OF INT'L L. & PRACrICE, A. B.
A. REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO ADJUDICATE WAR CRIMES COMWrr-
TED IN THE FORMER YuGosLAviA 44 (1993) [hereinafter A.B.A., YuGosLAv TRIBUNAL
REPORT].
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purposes of enforcement, the question of recognition for the purposes of
preventing double jeopardy is far differentY The case of enforcement
between states entails one state's imposition on the sovereignty of an-
other, with the enforcing state doing the bidding of its adjudicating
neighbour. In contrast, the case of recognition between states for double
jeopardy purposes is concerned more with upholding the rights of the
individual than with relations between sovereign entities.98
English law enforces a strong double jeopardy guarantee between
foreign domestic jurisdictions. Proof of a conviction or acquittal in a
foreign state will sustain a plea of autrefois convict or acquit in respect
of an English prosecution for the same act or acts, providing that the
foreign court was a court of competent jurisdiction and the person truly
was in jeopardy in the foreign proceeding. 9 This rule has long-standing
support among criminal law scholars."° In Canada, the law is generally
the same, although the Supreme Court of Canada has unfortunately
departed from such a strong interpretation of double jeopardy protection
in extradition cases.'' The Law Reform Commission of Canada has
endorsed the English position, namely, that double jeopardy protection
should be enforced between foreign jurisdictions."° The European Con-
vention on Double Jeopardy and the Harvard Draft Convention on
Jurisdiction adopt similar approaches. 3
7 FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, supra note 86, at 357.
9' To the extent that double jeopardy matters do implicate international relations,
they speak in favor of recognition between states for the purposes of double jeopardy.
See infra note 104.
9' The second proviso has been interpreted to deny double jeopardy protection to
a person who had been convicted in absentia abroad and had no intention of ever
returning to that jurisdiction. See, e.g., R. v. Thomas, [1984] 3 All E.R. 34 (Eng.
C.A.).
'0o See FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, supra note 86, at 360-68.
... For a discussion of the general rule in Canada, see DOUBLE JEOPARDY, PLEAS
AND VERDICrS 15-17 (L. Reform Comm'n of Canada Working Paper No. 63, 1991).
For the Canadian Supreme Court's most egregious rejection of double jeopardy prin-
ciples, see R. v. Van Rassel, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 225, 225-27 (Can.), wherein the Court
upheld the conviction of a person who, prior to extradition to Canada, had already
been tried and acquitted in the United States for the same act.
102 DOUBLE JEOPARDY, PLEAS AND VERDICTS, supra note 101, at 61.
103 E.C. Double Jeopardy Convention, supra note 89, at art. 1, 20 E.C. BULL. No.
5 at 114; Harvard Research, supra note 88, at 602-16. Like Canada, however, the
domestic American practice is not universally in favor of strong double jeopardy protec-
tion between jurisdictions. See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (upholding
the state court conviction of a person already convicted of the same offense by a fed-
eral court).
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We return to the question of non bis in idem between domestic and
international jurisdictions. In situation 2 above, the I.L.C. Draft Statute
would permit an international trial if the previous domestic trial either
had been for "an ordinary crime" or had been "a sham." This Article will
argue that, properly interpreted, the principle of non bis in idem permits
the second exception, but not the first.
The "sham exception" is consistent with both the English position on
interjurisdictional double jeopardy set out above, and the rationale under-
lying the double jeopardy guarantee itself. Under the sham exception,
three types of first trials (yielding an acquittal) would permit a second
prosecution: trials that were not impartial or independent; trials that were
designed to shield the accused from international criminal responsibility;
and trials that were not diligently prosecuted. Judicial impartiality or
independence is analogous to the English requirement that the foreign
court be a court of competent jurisdiction, in the sense that this criterion
looks more to the judicial quality of the first tribunal than to the quality
of the actual trial. Tribunals that are not impartial or independent could
be construed as not being courts of competent jurisdiction. The second
two trial types - "shielding" and "lack of diligence" - closely parallel
the English requirement that the accused have truly been in jeopardy in
the first proceeding in order to enforce double jeopardy protection. Both
"shielding" and "lack of diligence" protect the accused person, either by
design or effect, so as to remove any true sense of jeopardy from the
first trial. In this sense, a sham proceeding may be treated as a nullity for
double jeopardy purposes. Furthermore, the sham exception accords with
the equitable doctrine of bad faith in common law legal systems. There
is a palpable unfairness in permitting the accused to rely upon a sham
initial proceeding in order to avoid a second prosecution. Therefore,
largely by analogy to the domestic position in England, the sham excep-
tion is not inconsistent with the principle of non bis in idem in interna-
tional law.
The "ordinary crime" exception is another matter. Unlike the sham
exception, the ordinary crime exception does not question the integrity or
validity of the first trial; yet, though valid, the final order issued at that
first proceeding is ignored. This exception carries two costs. First and
most importantly, the ordinary crime exception mocks the double jeopardy
guarantee. The second cost can be raised more summarily: the subsequent
prosecution of a matter that, following a valid and impartial first trial, has
already been made the subject of a final order is in direct offense to
international comity."°4 Fisher states that interjurisdictional recognition
"' The principle of comity, comitas gentium, includes neighborliness, goodwill, and
mutual respect between sovereign states. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
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for the purposes of double jeopardy is necessitated by the principle of
comity." Although he made this assertion in the context of recognition
between states, his cogent reasoning is equally applicable to recognition
between domestic and international jurisdictions. If the I.L.C. Court were
to ignore the valid final order of a domestic court, whether on the back
of the ordinary crime exception or otherwise, it would indicate a serious
disregard for the sovereignty of the issuing state - and an affront to
international comity.
Returning to non bis in idem directly, like all civil and political
rights, the right to double jeopardy protection must be analyzed through
the eyes of the accused. It exists for that person's protection and before
that right is limited or restricted in any way, at the very least, legal
reasoning must be informed by an appreciation of how the right is actual-
ly experienced by the accused person. There is no escaping the fact that
the accused person is doubly harassed under the ordinary crime exception:
he or she must answer two separate cases on two separate occasions
before two different tribunals, all for the same act. That person does not
distinguish factually between the successive prosecutions, even if he or
she can appreciate the finer legal distinctions between trials for ordinary
crimes and trials for international crimes. Murder is murder, for example,
whether it is stigmatized through the Criminal Code of Canada or the
Geneva Conventions:
It is all the same to the accused. From his standpoint the situation is the
same whether the successive prosecutions are by the same or different
sovereignties; one is as bad as the other."°
Almost certainly, the ordinary crime exception will be defended on
the basis that it permits the prosecution of different legal acts, albeit
arising from the same factual act. the first trial was for a domestic or
"ordinary" crime, and the second was for an international crime - two
wholly different offenses. Analogies may even be made to the familiar
domestic situation of a person being tried and convicted of aggravated
assault, and then tried and convicted of murder when the victim dies, all
to say that non bis in idem permits multiple prosecutions in respect of the
INTERNATIONAL LAW 29-30 (4th ed. 1990); J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 19-20 (9th ed. 1984).
lo6 See Fisher, supra note 87, at 603.
,o Id. at 598. Interestingly, the severity of the domestic sentence may far exceed the
penalty imposed by the international court. Unlike the courts of many states, the I.L.C.
Court is restricted to a combination of imprisonment and fines, and is not authorized
to impose capital punishment. Working Group Report, supra note 2, 1994 Draft Statute,
at art. 47, and Commentary, Addendum 2, at 26.
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same act. Any attempt to defend the ordinary crime exception on these
grounds must fail, for two reasons.
First, non bis in idem is broader than simply a prohibition against
being prosecuted twice for the same offense: it is a prohibition against
being prosecuted twice for the same cause."° In the assault/murder
example, a second prosecution was permissible because the death of the
victim had given rise to a fresh cause. In contrast, there is no fresh cause
in the case of a person being tried and convicted once for multiple counts
of murder, and then tried and convicted again for genocide. The cause re-
mained the same, certainly as viewed through the eyes of the accused,
and the final order arising from the first trial should bar a second prose-
cution. "Cause" must not be equated with "offense." If the double jeopar-
dy guarantee were limited to preventing multiple prosecutions for exactly
the same offense, it would never apply in interjurisdictional cases. Using
reasoning that is equally applicable to domestic-international recognition,
Friedland argues in favor of England's complete recognition of the final
orders of other states for double jeopardy purposes:
It would, of course, be impossible to find that the foreign offence was
exactly the same as the English offence. At the least, the foreign
offence would be against a different penal provision; and the elements
involved in the offence, the defences open to the accused, the burden of
proof, and the criminal process may all differ from the criminal law and
procedure in England. However, to require that the offence be exactly
the same would effectively eliminate the defence of double jeopardy in
these cases."n
Second, there is a tremendous practical difficulty in determining
whether the first (domestic) trial was in respect of an "ordinary" crime or
whether it was sufficiently "international" to warrant the respect of the
" Recall that the double jeopardy guarantee originates in the principle nemo debet
bis vexari pro una et eadem causa, or, no one should be twice harassed for one and
the same cause.
103 FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, supra note 86, at 383. This view was endorsed
by the Canadian Law Reform Commission in its 1991 recommendations. See DOUBLE
JEOPARDY, PLEAS AND VERDIcTs, supra note 101, at 61 ("Where a person is charged
in Canada with the same or a substantially similar crime for which the person was
acquitted or convicted by a court ... in a foreign state, the foreign acquittal or con-
viction should have the "sane effect as a judgment in Canada .... ") (emphasis
added). Similarly, for the purposes of double criminality in extradition cases, it is ac-
knowledged that offenses in different jurisdictions can never be exactly the same. See
ANNE W. LA FOREST, LA FOREsT's EXTRADITON To AND FROM CANADA 70-71 (3d
ed. 1991).
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I.L.C. Court. The criminal laws of many countries do not make such
ordinary international divisions: for example, although Canada has incor-
porated numerous international crimes into its domestic laws, categoriza-
tion into "ordinary" and "international" would be difficult and some
offenses, such as murder, presumably straddle both categories."' This
second weakness in the ordinary crime exception has been acknowledged
within the I.L.C. itself. James Crawford, Chair of the 1994 Working
Group on the Draft Statute and Chair of the 1993 Sub-Group on Jurisdic-
tion and Applicable Law, has publicly mused that the ordinary crime
exception may be in breach of Article 14(7) of the Civil and Political
Rights Covenant, which incorporates the principle of non bis in idem:
But there is a serious question whether the availability of a second trial
in respect of a case involving "an ordinary crime" is really consistent
with the guarantee in Article 14(7) of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. The classification of an offence as an "ordi-
nary crime" is independent of the facts of the given case .... In some
legal systems there is no distinction between crimes which are "ordi-
nary" and those which are not. And in any event ordinary crimes (e.g.,
murder) can be just as serious, and can cover the same ground, as crime
within the jurisdiction of the court. On this view, it is not sufficient to
ensure compliance with Article 14(7) merely to provide that a sentence
already served for the corresponding ordinary crime will be taken into
account."0
Like so many contributions to the international criminal court debate,
the ordinary crime exception does not withstand principled critical analy-
sis. However laudable and important it is to construct an effective mecha-
nism for international criminal prosecution, the principle of non bis in
idem must not be circumvented in the process:
While there certainly is a legitimate and strong interest in seeing those
who have committed crimes against humanity [for example] . . . brought
to justice, there appears to be no reason to suppose that this interest is
so compelling that it ought to override the considerations that underpin
the widespread prohibition against double jeopardy. No civilized legal
109 The Canadian Criminal Code includes the offenses of war crimes and crimes
against humanity, Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 7 (1993) (Can.); piracy, id. § 74;
torture, id. §§ 7, 269.1; and crimes against internationally protected persons, id. § 431.
All of these have obvious counterparts in international criminal law.
"o Crawford, Draft Statute, supra note 16, at 144. This criticism of the ordinary
crime exception has obvious implications for the legality of the statutes for the
Yugoslav and Rwandan tribunals, which contain very similar provisions.
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system places ascertainment of guilt and conviction above all other
considerations.'
Therefore, the I.L.C. is strongly urged to abandon the ordinary crime
exception to the double jeopardy guarantee in Article 42 of the Draft
Statute. The sham exception to the guarantee is not inconsistent with non
bis in idem, and is broad enough to address the fear that fabricated
domestic trials will shield criminals from international prosecution.
2. Double Jeopardy in Appeal and Review
Part 6 of the Draft Statute provides for appeal and review."' Pursu-
ant to Article 14, paragraph 5 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant,
every person convicted of a crime has the right to an appeal of sentence
and conviction.113 Because appeal and review threaten the finality of the
order made at trial, Part 6 has significant implications for the right to
double jeopardy protection. The question at hand is whether the I.L.C.
has struck the proper balance between finality and appeal/review in the
Draft Statute.
The Statute grants equal rights of appeal to the prosecutor and
convicted person, on the following grounds: procedural unfairness, error
of fact or law, or disproportion between crime and sentence."' These
rights extend to orders of conviction, acquittal, and sentence. The sole
"n A.B.A., YuGosLAv TRIBUNAL REPORT, supra note 96, at 43. Note, however, that
the A.B.A.'s complete position on double jeopardy before international tribunals is
somewhat anomalous. In respect of the Yugoslav Statute, which contains a similar ordi-
nary crime exception, the A.B.A. recommended that "ordinary crime" be clarified, but
not abandoned as a violation of principle. Id. at 45-46. In respect of the I.L.C. Draft
Statute, the A.B.A. approved of the ordinary crime exception without clarification, but
curiously recommended that the general double jeopardy guarantee be substantially
weakened to apply only to states parties that had accepted the I.L.C. Court's jurisdic-
tion in that particular case. American Bar Association, Task Force Report on an In-
ternational Criminal Court, 28 INT'L LAWYER 475, 499-500 [hereinafter Task Force
Report on an International Criminal Court]. Finally, in the A.B.A.'s own 1991 proposal
for an international criminal court, double jeopardy concerns were not addressed. Id.
.2 Note that Article 9 provides for the establishment of a separate appellate chamber
which would consist of the President of the Court and six other judges, at least three
of whom must be recognized experts in international law. Working Group Report, supra
note 2, 1994 Draft Statute, at art. 9.
,13 I.C.C.P.R., supra note 61, at art. 14, f5, 999 U.N.T.S. at 177.
114 Working Group Report, supra note 2, 1994 Draft Statute, at art. 48. The grant
of equal rights of appeal mirrors the approach taken in Article 25 of the Yugoslav
Statute, supra note 11, 32 I.L.M. at 1186, and Article 24 of the Rwandan Statute,
supra note 12, 33 I.L.M. at 1611.
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difference in prosecutorial and convicted person appeals lies in the powers
of the Appeals Chamber. Following a successful appeal from acquittal by
the prosecutor, the chamber would be restricted to ordering a new trial;
in contrast, following a successful convicted person appeal, the chamber
could reverse or amend the trial decision or, if necessary, order a new
trial."5 Revision would also be equally available to the prosecutor and
convicted person on the grounds that new evidence had been discovered
which had not been available at the time of the conviction and which
could have been a decisive factor in the conviction."6 The Statute does
not allow for the review of an acquittal, a decision that the Working
Group believed was compelled by the principle of non bis in idem."7
In spite of its sound approach to revision, the I.L.C. has designed an
appeal structure that has a great potential to subvert the double jeopardy
guarantee. Specifically, the expansive right of prosecutorial appeal in the
Statute directly threatens the accused person's expectation of finality after
trial. The remedy restriction imposed on the Appeals Chamber when
allowing an appeal from acquittal does not address the fundamental
problem that the accused would still be placed in jeopardy twice for the
same offense. This is not to say that the concept of a prosecutorial right
of appeal per se is inconsistent with non bis in idem. Article 14(7) of the
Civil and Political Rights Covenant recognizes that double jeopardy
protection is a right held by any person finally convicted or acquitted of
a criminal offense; "finally" must be taken to contemplate lawful avenues
of appeal, whether initiated by the prosecutor or convicted person, a view
that has been adopted in the domestic context by the Supreme Court of
Canada."' Nevertheless, the greater the ability of a prosecutor to disturb
the verdict rendered at trial, more precisely an order of acquittal, the
weaker the acquitted person's right to double jeopardy protection. In its
most extreme form, the prosecutorial right of appeal would allow an
accused person to be tried again and again, being made to face increas-
ingly strong cases by the prosecution, until finally the probability of
conviction approached a certainty.
In domestic Canadian law, this evil is prevented by limiting the
,, Working Group Report, supra note 2, 1994 Draft Statute, at art. 49.
16 Id. at art. 50. This review provision is substantially the same as Article 26 of
the Yugoslav Statute, supra note 12, 32 I.L.M. at 1187, and Article 25 of the Rwandan
Statute, supra note 13, 33 I.L.M. at 1611.
,.7 See Working Group Report, supra note 2, Commentary, Addendum 3, at 3-4.
,"8 R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, affg on this point 52 O.R.2d 353 (C.A.
1986). This decision was based in part on section 11(h) of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, supra note 61, which also ascribes the double jeopardy right to
persons "fmally" acquitted or convicted of an offense.
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Crown's right to appeal from an acquittal to questions of law alone. 9
Yet, even this position has been criticized as being inconsistent with non
bis in idem, particularly in light of the indeterminacy of the distinction
between questions of fact and law."2
In England and the majority of the other Commonwealth countries,
the Crown is not able to appeal from an acquittal on any ground.'
Similarly, the American domestic position eliminates prosecutorial appeals
from acquittal altogether.
A State may not put a defendant in jeopardy twice for the same of-
fence. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784. The constitutional protection
against double jeopardy unequivocally prohibits a second trial following
an acquittal. The public interest in the finality of criminal judgments is
so strong that an acquitted defendant may not be retried even though
"the acquittal was based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation." See
Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143. If the innocence of the
accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution
conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair."
Reliance on the precedent set in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
should not assist the I.L.C. The fact that the Yugoslav and Rwandan
tribunal statutes permit prosecutorial appeals from an acquittal has itself
been criticized as undermining the double jeopardy guarantee. The
American Bar Association has recommended that prosecutorial appeals be
restricted to interlocutory questions of law only, with only the accused
being able to appeal any final order made at trial."
The foregoing criticisms of a liberal prosecutorial right of appeal
make eminent sense. While avenues of appeal are contemplated by the
double jeopardy guarantee in Article 14(7), the guarantee would be
effectively gutted if the prosecution were unrestricted in its ability to
mount successive attempts at winning a conviction. Therefore, the ability
of a prosecutor to appeal from an acquittal on grounds other than ques-
19 Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 676(1)(a) (1993) (Can.).
' See C. David Freeman, Double Jeopardy Protection in Canada: A Consideration
of Development, Doctrine and a Current Controversy, 12 CIuM. LJ. 3, 19-22, 26-27
(1988) (proposing that prosecutorial appeals be limited to questions of law that arise
prior to the entry of a plea by the accused person).
"2 The Commonwealth positions are briefly surveyed by the Ontario Court of
Appeal in R. v. Morgentaler, 52 O.R.2d at 403-04.
" Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978).
'2 See A.B.A., YuGosLAv TRIBUNAL REPORT, supra note 96, at 41-43; Task Force
Report on an International Criminal Court, supra note 111, at 505-06 (regarding the
I.L.C. Draft Statute).
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tions of law alone is not practically consistent with non bis in idem, and
the I.L.C. is urged to amend the Draft Statute in this respect.
The prosecutor's ability to appeal from an acquittal on questions of
law alone is more difficult to resolve, especially in light of the domestic
prohibition on such appeals that exists in several states. There is an
obvious interest in ensuring that the final judgments of the I.L.C. Court
are correct in law, an objective which is not diminished by the fact that
a legal error at trial may have yielded an acquittal. The dichotomy
between questions of fact and law is perpetuated by the personnel struc-
ture that is envisioned for the Court: the judges of the Trial Chamber are
expected to be criminal trial experts, while the Appeals Chamber will
have a greater proportion of judges with only international law expertise,
but not necessarily criminal trial expertise.'" Consequently, while find-
ings of fact made at trial may be highly reliable and worthy of preserva-
tion, it may be desirable for the Appeals Chamber to be able to scrutinize
the trial judge's decisions of law - even if those decisions had produced
an acquittal. Therefore, relying considerably on the Canadian domestic
approach, this author is not prepared to recommend the elimination of the
prosecutorial right of appeal from acquittal on questions of law alone.
However, this should be the sole avenue for prosecutorial appeals from
acquittals rendered at trial.
E. Deterrence
The preceding discussion concludes this Article's assessment of the
1994 I.L.C. Draft Statute in respect of four principles of international
criminal law that have strong ties to jurisdictional structure. The Article
moves now to a consideration of how well the Draft Statute is capable of
fulfilling the two most important objectives of international criminal law
that relate to jurisdiction: deterrence and legitimacy. Unlike principles,
objectives demand no proof of their status in international law. Instead,
they represent the goals of the international court project, or more pre-
cisely for the purposes of this Article, those goals of the project that
determine what form the court's jurisdictional structure should take.
The objective of deterrence is critical. It is the world community's
desire to avert future criminal acts, particularly acts of the horrifying
scale and gravity seen on numerous occasions this century, that provides
the greatest impetus for the establishment of a permanent international
criminal court. More broadly, deterrence could be seen as a necessary
objective of any criminal justice system:
,24 See Working Group Report, supra note 2, 1994 Draft Statute, at arts. 6, 9.
[Vol. 28:221
JURISDICTIONAL STRUCTURE
Without a reasonable prospect of thereby reducing the incidence of
harm, it would be difficult to defend a system of penal sanctions. 5
General deterrence is most effective when the moral stigma of
criminalization is combined with the concomitant expectation of eventual
prosecution and punishment.25 Certainty and predictability play large
roles in deterrence: the ability of a law or penal institution to deter hinges
directly on the degree to which would-be offenders can predict the
consequences of committing crimes, especially the fact that they will
definitely be prosecuted."z Another inadequacy of ad hockery is ex-
posed: in light of the rarity with which ad hoc tribunals have been
convened, as well as the variability of their jurisdictional structures, there
is no predictability in the Yugoslav/Rwandan approach, and thus, no
deterrence. Once again, the I.L.C.'s choice of a permanently constituted
court is commendable. Furthermore, by eliminating the "barrier" of state
consent for genocide matters, the grant of inherent jurisdiction to the
Court for this offense is laudable from the perspective of deterrence.
Providing that the court receives a complaint of genocide from a state
that is party to both the Draft Statute and the Genocide Convention, there
would be no legal barriers to prosecution.
One important barrier to prosecution remains in the proposed system,
however. In failing to eliminate the political offense exception to extradi-
tion, the Draft Statute is seriously deficient. The Draft Statute provides
for the transfer of persons to the I.L.C. Court in a manner similar to
extradition, with state obligations to cooperate varying in relation to the
type of offense and the position of the requested state under the Stat-
ute. 9 Unless a higher obligation is specified, a state party faced with
a transfer request would merely be obliged to follow its own legal proce-
dures, which in many states include recognition of the political offense
exception." The product of eighteenth and nineteenth-century liberalism
"z COLvIN, supra note 67, at 28. Deterrence will be used here in its "general"
sense; specific deterrence in the form of the incarceration of the convicted criminal,
while an obvious objective of international prosecution, speaks more to questions of en-
forcement than the jurisdictional structure of an international court.
116 BAssiOUNr, DRAFr CODE AND STATUTE, supra note 6, at 54.
'z' COLViN, supra note 67, at 25-37.
'" Naturally, other extra-judicial factors may prevent prosecution and enforcement.
The degree to which states fulfill their duty to cooperate with the I.L.C. Court under
Part 7 of the Draft Statute will also determine the effectiveness of the model and,
consequently, its deterrent effect.
'2 Working Group Report, supra note 2, 1994 Draft Statute, at art. 53.
,3 Significantly, through the Draft Statute's incorporation of the Genocide Conven-
tion, the political offense exception would not apply to a transfer request for a person
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and the promotion of free political expression, the political offense
exception is used by a state to refuse the extradition of a person suspect-
ed or convicted of a political offense. It has been the basis of extradition
refusals between even otherwise friendly states such as the United King-
dom and the United States.'3'
The political offense exception has been strongly criticized as
outdated in our age of modem terrorism where the line between political
and criminal acts is not always easily drawn.' The most serious inter-
national crimes frequently have a high political content. It is almost
inconceivable how, for example, genocide could be perpetrated without
the active participation or, at the very least, complicity of government
officials.' By precluding justiciability for terrorist-related offenses, for
example, the political offense exception invites the exclusion of cases
pertaining to apartheid, torture, and other offenses that are envisioned to
be the core of the I.L.C. Court's work. Randall argues that the political
offense exception eviscerates any meaningful role for judicial settlement
in human rights and terrorist cases. Moreover, the judiciary is better
suited to the adjudication of "political" offenses than the political organs
of government due to its relative impartiality and, not surprisingly, its
proficiency in the very business of adjudication.' The failure of the
Yugoslav Statute to eliminate the political offense exception has been at-
tacked.'35 Whatever merits the political offense exception may still hold
in inter-state extradition matters, it should not exist as an option for
transfers to an independent international criminal court.'36 Therefore, the
I.L.C. is urged to expressly preclude the political offense exception in the
Draft Statute.
F. Legitimacy
suspected of genocide. The Genocide Convention explicitly prohibits use of the political
offense exception. Genocide Convention, supra note 14, at art. VII, S. REP. No. 2, at
10; 78 U.N.T.S. at 282.
,' The United States has denied at least four British requests in recent years for the
extradition of persons suspected of offenses related to the Irish Republican Army.
Scharf, supra note 15, at 155, n.126. See also LA FOREST, supra note 108, at 81-83.
,32 Burgos, supra note 56, at 3-4.
,3 See generally RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIs RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 92-94 (1944).
134 KENNETH C. RANDALL, -FEDERAL COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS PARADIGM 108-11 (1990). See also Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean
Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (defending the legitimacy of the Court's adjudicative
role even in cases with "significant political overtones").
,3' A.B.A., YUGOSLAV TRIBUNAL REPORT, supra note 96, at 52-54.
"3 Scharf, supra note 15, at 156.
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Where there is no centralized enforcement of norms, as in interna-
tional law, the voluntary compliance of parties is a key determinant of an
institution's success. According to Franck, voluntary compliance is a
product of the collection of perceived qualities that attach to any rule or
institution, all of which is caught within the term "legitimacy."'37 He
defines legitimacy as "a property of a rule or a rule-making institution
which itself exerts a pull towards compliance on those addressed norma-
tively because those addressed believe that the rule has come into being
and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right
process."'38 Thus, legitimacy determines the normative durability and
stability of a rule or institution, and consequently, the degree to which
parties will voluntarily follow it.
This is not to suggest that Franck's theory of legitimacy is necessari-
ly unproblematic and internally consistent at all levels. It awkwardly
combines descriptiveness and normativeness, occasionally in circular
fashion. At times, it is descriptive (rule/institution X is legitimate because
states feel bound to obey it), and at others, predictive (states will feel
bound to obey rule/institution X because it is legitimate). In large mea-
sure, this difficulty is attributable to Franck's contextual approach. At the
same time that he establishes a seemingly objective, analytical framework
for empirically assessing the legitimacy of a rule or institution, he makes
the theory reflective of how states actually react toward the rule or
institution. Paradoxically, however, contextualization is the ultimate
strength of the theory, and whatever limitations it may have in extended
applications, Franck's approach to international compliance is the most
sophisticated analysis available today.'39 This Article proposes that legiti-
macy should be regarded as an important objective of international law-
making, and that Franck's conceptualization of legitimacy is a useful
framework for assessing how well this objective is being or will be
achieved.
Franck identifies four indicia of legitimacy: adherence, determinacy,
In See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGrrIMACY AMONG
NATIONS (1990) [hereinafter FRANCK, THE PowER OF LEGrMACY]. Franck's general
course in 1993 at the Hague Academy of International Law was a model of insight in
the area of legitimacy and international institutions, and an excellent summary of his
conceptualization of legitimacy can be found in the collected Academy lectures. See
also FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND INSTrTUTIONAL SYSTEM,
supra note 52, at 41-62.
133 FRANCK, THE POWER OF LErrMACY, supra note 137, at 24.
... For a brief but perceptive critique of Franck's theory of legitimacy, see Marti
Koskenniemi, Book Review, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 175 (1992) (reviewing THOMAS M.
FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGImMcY AMONG NATIONS).
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symbolic validation, and coherence, all of which are discussed in more
detail below. The objective of legitimacy is consistent with the
contractarian view of community, and it is consistent with the traditional
view of sovereign and equal states consensually contracting with each
other to establish an international legal system.'" It follows that legiti-
macy demands the free participation of states in the creation of inter-
national institutions. 4, The requirement of free state participation in the
construction of an international criminal court has obvious implications
for whether the I.L.C. was correct in proposing a court with concurrent
original jurisdiction. Exclusive jurisdiction would have necessitated a
mechanism for asserting jurisdiction that was at least partly compulsory
in order to secure voluntary mechanisms for submitting a case to in-
temational prosecution. Furthermore, concurrent jurisdiction is the trend in
the practice of international criminal law between states. Due to both the
changing nature of international criminal activity and the pattern of state
exercise of jurisdiction, states are becoming less willing to defer to other
states and an increasing number of criminal cases are now subject to
concurrent jurisdiction. 42 In its contemplation of an international crim-
inal court, the Genocide Convention also envisages a court that may share
its jurisdiction over genocide with the domestic courts of states. 43 Inter-
national support is far greater for a concurrent criminal court than for a
court with exclusive jurisdiction.'" Aside from the Sottile Proposal
(1951), which was silent on this point, and the Bassi6uni Proposal (1987),
which used "primacy" to effectively create an exclusive jurisdiction
model, all previous proposals for a permanent international criminal court
have advocated the concurrent approach.
The legitimacy of the concurrent approach is revealed by Franck's
four-part analytical framework. Adherence is the vertical nexus between
,40 See FRANCK, FArNES IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL
SYsTEM, supra note 52, at 47. Accordingly, Franck states that the first necessary
condition of legitimacy is state consent, and the second, pacta sunt servanda, or,
parties are bound to that to which they consent. Id.
141 Similarly, the degree of state participation and consent is an important factor in
determining an international institution's political acceptability. The spectre of losing
sovereignty involuntarily to an international court is a frequently cited concern of states.
See M. Cherif Bassinuni & Christopher L. Blakesley, The Need for an International
Criminal Court in the New International World Order, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
151, 161 (1992).
142 FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, supra note 86, at 357, 372-75.
14' Genocide Convention, supra note 14, at art. VI, S. REP. No. 2, at 9; 78
U.N.T.S. at 281-82.
" See, e.g., Task Force Report on an International Criminal Court, supra note 111,
at 475.
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a primary rule of obligation (or, writ large, an institution) and the pyra-
mid of secondary process rules in the community. These process rules
refer to the method by which the community makes, interprets, and
applies the primary rule or institution. In respect of an international
criminal court, the primary rule is the court itself. The secondary process
rules are the ways in which states ordinarily create, participate in, and
respond to international institutions. The above trend indicates that
existing process rules favor international jurisdictional structures that are
concurrent, not exclusive, which suggests that the I.L.C. Court should
enjoy a high level of adherence among states.
Adherence will be further sustained by other characteristics of the
Court. The I.L.C. has chosen an approach that is not only concurrent, but
also almost entirely voluntary. Save its inherent jurisdiction over genocide
and the possibility of Security Council action, the I.L.C. Court would
assume jurisdiction in a given case only through state consent. Moreover,
the I.L.C. Court would be able to defer to domestic proceedings in any
given case, either upon application by a state or by the accused, or on its
own motion. 45 While its implications for determinacy will be considered
later, this high level of voluntariness accords with the usual establishment,
interpretation, and application processes in international law. It also
complements the existing system of inter-state extradition which, even
when governed by an extradition treaty, retains a large amount of volun-
tary executive discretion.'" The I.L.C.'s implementation method, volun-
tary accession to a multilateral treaty, is the normal method for establish-
ing an international tribunal - a sharp contrast to the coercive imposition
of the four international tribunals established to date. In his report on the
creation of the Yugoslav Tribunal, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali explained the usual implementation process and outlined some of
the reasons why the multilateral treaty option is popular among states:
The approach which, in the normal course of events, would be followed
in establishing an international tribunal would be the conclusion of a
treaty by which the States parties would establish a tribunal and approve
its statute. This treaty would be drawn up and adopted by an appropriate
international body (e.g., the General Assembly or a specially convened
conference), following which it would be opened for signature and
Working Group Report, supra note 2, 1994 Draft Statute, at art. 35. This reflects
the LL.C.'s belief that some cases may not be appropriate for international adjudication,
even if all formal requirements for the international court's jurisdiction have been met.
See Crawford, ILC Statute, supra note 16, at 413-14.
" For a discussion of the benefits of complementing the existing system, see
Scharf, supra note 15, at 160-61.
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ratification. Such an approach would have the advantage of allowing for
a detailed examination and elaboration of all the issues pertaining to the
establishment of the international tribunal. It also would allow the States
participating in the negotiation and conclusion of the treaty to exercise
their sovereign will, in particular whether they wish to become parties
to the treaty or not.147
In addition to gaining adherence through the normal establishment
process, the I.L.C. Court would have adherence on the basis of the
impartiality and competence of its judges. The international institution
with the highest perceived legitimacy and fairness today is the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, and this status has been largely won by its
institutional and adjudicative independence. 4 By attempting to build a
new court that is consistent with this standard, the I.L.C. increases the
adherence level of its Draft Statute. The importance of this element of
adherence is evident when new proposals are compared with Nuremberg
and Tokyo:
The post-World War II Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals may well have
made good law, but the prestige of the law thus made was not helped
by the evident fact that these were victors' tribunals. A more evidently
impartial tribunal composed of more manifestly independent and highly
qualified international jurists would enhance the prestige and capacity of
the law thus made to pull States and persons towards future compli-
ance.
14 9
The Draft Statute's sole departures from voluntariness and the normal
method of establishment are its contemplation of Security Council action
and its grant of inherent jurisdiction over genocide. The incorporation of
Security Council measures taken under Chapter VII is more than merely
a concession to that body's predominant position in international affairs.
It is also an acknowledgment that, for all the attributes of a generally
voluntary approach, some form of compulsory jurisdiction may be neces-
147 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., T19, at 6-7, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993),
reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1163 (1993). Of course, in the particular case of the former
Yugoslavia, the Secretary-General endorsed the idea of an ad hoc tribunal imposed by
the Security Council, given the urgency of the situation and the time that would be re-
quired to establish a permanent tribunal. Id. T1 21-28, I.L.M. at 1168-69.
"s FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND INSTrUTONAL SYSTEM,
supra note 52, at 302-03.
"" Id. at 265. Although this passage was written in reference to the Yugoslav
Tribunal, and not in the specific context of adherence, its reasoning applies equally to
an appraisal of the I.L.C. Court.
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sary in some situations. 5' In light of the Security Council's growing
fondness for Chapter VII action, it is far better that any impositions of
judicial settlement be made through a permanent institution than an ad
hoc tribunal. As for the I.L.C. Court's inherent jurisdiction over genocide,
there is a sufficiently high level of international approbation regarding this
offense, including its undeniable status as jus cogens and the widespread
ratification of the Genocide Convention, that it may be reasonable to
isolate genocide as deserving such treatment. Certainly, among the
members of the Working Group of the I.L.C., such special treatment of
the offense of genocide was wholly uncontroversial.' The I.L.C.
Court's inherent jurisdiction over genocide also highlights the tension
between the different components of legitimacy. What legitimacy the
Court may lose in adherence on the genocide question, it may gain in the
second component of Franck's framework, determinacy. Determinacy is
the textual ability of a rule (or an institution) to convey a clear message
or meaning. Rules or institutions that say what they expect of their
constituencies are more likely to influence behaviour. The more deter-
minate or inelastic the standard, the more difficult it is to justify non-
compliance. In respect of an international criminal court, determinacy
requires that the court's role be readily apparent; that the scope of its
jurisdiction be ascertained (or readily ascertainable); and that its applica-
bility and relevance be generally obvious and easily understood. In setting
out a clear list of its subject matter offenses, the Draft Statute is more
determinate than, for example, the "menu" or "accordion" approach
advocated in the A.B.A. Proposal (1991). However, this clarity is under-
mined by the complexity of the scheme by which the I.L.C. Court is able
to assert jurisdiction in a given case. For the offense of genocide, howev-
er, notwithstanding potential adherence difficulties, the Draft Statute is
highly determinate. Once a complaint of genocide is filed by a state that
is party to both the Statute of the Court and the Genocide Convention,
the I.L.C. Court would automatically acquire inherent jurisdiction. There
is no requirement for state consent on a case-by-case basis and there is
a high obligation on states to cooperate in genocide matters. Not only is
such (relative) certainty the stuff of determinacy, it also furthers the
objective of deterrence that was assessed in the preceding section.
Within the general concurrent jurisdiction structure, however, deter-
minacy has an uphill struggle. Without the assistance of Bassi6uni's
"primacy" trump card, the I.L.C. Court would share jurisdiction in a
given case with one or several states, always dependent upon their
voluntary consent. There is no way of predicting the degree to which
Greenberg, supra note 1, at 138.
'51 See Working Group Report, supra note 2, Commentary, Addendum 1, at 21-22.
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states would submit cases to the Court, and the certainty of international
prosecution may not be much greater than it is today. At the same time,
there are several reasons why states may voluntarily decide to transfer
even difficult cases to the international court. For example, the state may
wish to avoid the international embarrassment, potential conflict and
retaliation that shielding an accused criminal invites."2 The state may
prefer independent international adjudication over domestic prosecution or
extradition in an especially sensitive criminal matter.' Moreover, re-
turning briefly to adherence, the very fact that the Court is voluntary and
complements the existing international system may produce higher levels
of state consent and submission, and greater certainty of international
prosecution. Finally, the attributes of the concurrent approach must be
measured against its principal alternative, compulsory exclusive jurisdic-
tion. Most significantly, the apparent certainty of a compulsory approach
may be no more than false determinacy in practice: even a court with
exclusive and compulsory jurisdiction would still require state consent and
cooperation in surrendering an accused person. 4
The third indicator of legitimacy, symbolic validation, is a rule or
institution's ability to communicate authority in a manner connected to
the overall social and legal order. The principal factor under this head is
the degree of permanency. Rules or institutions that are enduring or long-
acknowledged, such as the international rules relating to diplomatic
immunity, are better able to communicate authority than those of a
temporary or variable nature. The importance of symbolic validation
should not be underestimated. Franck suggests that high symbolic valida-
tion attracts greater obedience voluntarily than even massive force or
other coercive measures.'55 By rejecting the ad hoc approach in favor of
creating a permanent court, the I.L.C. proposes an institution with a high
degree of symbolic validation.
152 Bassi6uni & Blakesley, supra note 141, at 172-73.
'5 Following the Lockerbie aerial bombing incident, Libya refused the extradition
requests of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States for the two persons sus-
pected of the bombing, claiming that trials in those countries would not be independent
or impartial. However, Libya stated that it would agree to transfer the accused persons
to an international criminal tribunal for prosecution and trial. The stalemate continues.
See Baez, supra note 7, at 313.
"' See William N. Gianaris, The New World Order and the Need for an Internation-
al Criminal Court, 16 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 88, 116-17 (1992).
155 See FRANCK, FANESS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND INSTrrUTIoNAL
SYSTEM, supra note 52, at 51-54. For example, with very few exceptions, the blue-
helmeted peacekeeping missions of the U.N. have been successful in communicating
authority and attracting compliance without the use of significant force. Id.
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The final component of Franck's legitimacy has two aspects. Coher-
ence is comprised of consistency (treating like cases the same), and the
principled relationship of a rule or institution to other elements in the
same system. Consistency is an important objective of any judicial
institution, even tribunals such as the I.C.J. which are not technically
bound by stare decisis nonetheless strive for consistency in their rul-
ings. 6 Inconsistency in adjudication, that is, "checkerboarding,"1 " un-
dermines the confidence of both states and the general public in the
judicial process by suggesting that decisions bear no relation to the facts
or law at hand. An ad hoc approach which convenes temporary courts for
some crises and not others is the very essence of checkerboarding. It is
utterly incapable of interpreting international conventions or defining
international rights and duties in any consistent and enduring way. A
permanent court would be more capable of developing a consistent body
of international criminal law and, through its judicial record of decisions,
it could potentially assume the quasi-supervisory leadership role that the
I.C.J. now performs in public international law matters.
As for the second aspect of coherence, an institution's principled
relationship to other elements in the legal system represents the communi-
ty aspect of legitimacy. The greater the degree of connectedness, the more
the institution is perceived to belong as a functioning component in the
existing system. The I.L.C. Court's permanency mirrors the status of the
predominant judicial institution in the world today, the I.C.J. As well, the
Draft Statute's provision of a role for the Security Council establishes a
coherent relationship with the world's predominant multilateral political
institution. With the critical exception of some aspects of double jeopardy,
the Draft Statute also successfully incorporates the primary principles of
international criminal law, the most important of which (at least for the
purposes of jurisdiction) have been the subject of this Article. Conse-
quently, the I.L.C. has proposed an international criminal court that
should bear a high degree of connectedness to the institutions and princi-
ples that animate the existing legal system. This combination of character-
istics promises the birth of a relatively coherent tribunal and, all told, a
relatively legitimate judicial institution.
BOWET , supra note 80, at 274.
' Franck borrows this term from Ronald Dworkin. See FRANCK, FAPNEsS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM, supra note 52, at 55; RONALD
DwoRKiN, LAW'S EMPmE 179 (1986).
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IV. CONCLUSION
There is no question that the International Law Commission's 1994
Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court is a significant improve-
ment on the models and proposals of the past. In particular, the Draft
Statute should be celebrated as the promise of an end to the world
community's current affair with ad hoc approaches to the establishment
of international judicial bodies. At the same time, however, the jurisdic-
tional structure of the Draft Statute fails to accord completely with
fundamental principles and objectives of international criminal law.
Therefore, the I.L.C. is strongly urged to take the following steps to
amend the Draft Statute:
1. Amend Article 42 to expressly prohibit the trial of any person by the
Court who has already been tried by the Court in respect of the same act
or acts;
2. Remove Article 42(2)(a), thereby eliminating the "ordinary crime
exception" to the guarantee of non bis in idem;
3. Amend Article 48(1) to restrict the right of the Prosecutor to appeal
against a decision of acquittal to the ground of error of law alone; and
4. Amend Article 53 to expressly prohibit States parties from refusing a
transfer request from the Registrar on the basis of the "political offense
exception."
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